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ABSTRACT
This article has a dual aim: it aims to contribute to the substance
of comparative corporate law and it aims to advance the
methodology of comparative legal research. In substantive terms,
the article addresses the key question about the design of a suitable
board structure. It notes that today many countries not only allow
modifications of the default structure, but provide two separate
legal templates by giving firms a choice between a one-tier and a
two-tier board model. Yet, information on the actual choices made
by companies is rare. This article aims to fill this gap. It presents
original data about the choice of board models from fourteen
European jurisdictions, analyzing variations of popularity of these
models at the country level. For this purpose, the article applies the
techniques of “correspondence analysis” and “qualitative
comparative analysis,” which have been developed by other
academic disciplines but have so far been rarely employed in
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comparative legal scholarship. One of the main advantages of these
techniques is that they do not depend on a large number of
observations as is the case for econometric methods. They are also
intuitive to use for legal scholars as they are not simply based on
particular numerical scores (such as significant levels) but ask
researchers to use their qualitative skills and knowledge in research
design and evaluation. In conclusion, the new data and analyses
show that there are profound country differences in the preferred
choice for one of the board models and that both path dependence
and legal differences can help to explain those variations.
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INTRODUCTION

Many private companies are simply managed by a single
person. Yet, for public companies (joint-stock companies), having a
suitable board structure is a key aspect of corporate governance. But
how should such board structure be designed? From a comparative
perspective, scholars often distinguish between a one-tier (or
monist) model with a single board of directors and a two-tier (or
dualist)
model
with
a
supervisory
board
and
a
management/executive board. 1 Traditionally, the law of public
companies only provides for one of these models, typically making
it mandatory. However, there is also a trend to let companies freely
choose their board model. This can be observed in most parts of the
world: for example, a choice of board models for which the law
provides two sets of templates is possible in countries as diverse as
Algeria, Japan, Russia, Vietnam and, to some extent, also Brazil.2
In the European Union (EU), more than half of the Member
States allow board choice in their laws of public companies today,
and there is also such a rule for the special legal form of the
European Company (SE) which can be chosen in all countries of the
European Economic Area (EEA).3 How companies actually make
use of this availability of board choice is, however, largely
underexplored; 4 in particular there has not yet been an empirical
exploration of all EU countries that allow such board choice today.
The research project from which this article derives aims to fill this
gap as it presents and analyses original data about the choice of
board models from fourteen EU Member States (as well as the SE).
This article in particular focuses on the variations of popularity of
For details see infra Part II.A.
Choice between one-tier and two-tier models in: Algeria ([ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺘﺠﺎرةCode of
Commerce] arts. 610, 642), Russia (Об акционерном обществе, [Federal Law of
the Russian Federation on Joint Stock Companies] federal’nyĭ zakon [Federal Law]
1995, No. 208-FZ, art. 64) (choice only for companies with less than fifty
shareholders; larger companies need to be two-tier), and Vietnam (Luật Doanh
nghiệp [Law on Enterprises], No. 59/2020/QH14, Art. 137) (Viet.) and between
three models in Japan (会社法[Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 1995, 1995, arts. 32627), also with differentiations according to the size of the company). In Brazil, the
choice between one-tier and audit model depends on the request of a ten percent
minority of voting sharesholders or a five percent minority of nonvoting
shareholders to appoint a board of auditors (Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de
1976, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL (t.1): de 15.12.1976, art. 161.
3
For details see infra Part II.C.
4
For details see infra Part III.A.
1
2
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particular models at the country level—and thus a topic of
comparative corporate law—while companion articles will analyze
the firm level data in detail. Doing so, this article also contributes to
the more general comparative question how far both the design and
the application of the same legal idea (here: enabling choice of board
models) may be very different across countries, for example due to
reasons of path dependence.5
A further innovation of this article is that it applies new formal
techniques of empirical comparative law in order to understand
different preferences in the use of the board models across
countries.6 Given that the number of units is relatively small (n = 14,
i.e., the fourteen EU Member States that allow board choice), it
would not be feasible to use econometric tools which have been the
main focus of discussions about the benefits and shortcomings of
using methods of empirical legal studies in comparative law.7 By
contrast, “correspondence analysis” and “qualitative comparative
analysis” can be applied to this type of data. These techniques have
so far been rarely employed in comparative legal scholarship. Thus,
this article also aims to show that comparative law can benefit from
such formal methods, not least since it is often concerned with
comparisons between a small number of units.8
The structure of this article is as follows. Part II explains the
different corporate board models and the availability of choice in
more detail. Part III addresses the previous attempts of data
collection and then presents its own empirical findings. Part IV

5
For this concept, see, for example, John Bell, Path Dependence and Legal
Development, 87 TUL. L. REV. 787, 809 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political
Options, and Governance Systems, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS
AND MATERIALS 165, 175-81 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1997).
6
For details see infra Part IV.
7 See, e.g., Holger Spamann, Empirical Comparative Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. SOC.
SCI. 131(2015); Christoph Engel, Challenges in the Interdisciplinary Use of Comparative
Law (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper No.
2020/29, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3739754 [https://perma.cc/N4D336EU].
8
This can also be seen in the main general books on comparative corporate
law: for example, CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE & MICHAEL SCHILLIG, COMPARATIVE
COMPANY LAW (2019) (dealing with four countries); COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW: A
CASE-BASED APPROACH (Mathias Siems & David Cabrelli eds., 2nd ed. 2018) (dealing
with twelve countries); ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD, COMPARATIVE
COMPANY LAW (2nd ed. 2018) (dealing with three jurisdictions); MARCO
VENTORUZZO ET. AL., COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW (2015) (mainly dealing with
nine countries).
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evaluates possible reasons for different preferences across the
fourteen EU Member States. Part V concludes.
II. BOARD MODELS AND AVAILABILITY OF CHOICE IN THE EU
a. One-tier, Two-tier, and Possible Further Models
The historical starting point of corporate governance in most
countries was the one-tier model, i.e., the model with a single board
of directors. However, some early companies also had a two-tier
structure: for example, it is said the Dutch East India Company (the
VOC) already created a “sort of supervisory board” in 1623.9 In the
subsequent centuries, the Netherlands also continued to have some
companies with “supervisory directors” though this was not
mandatory and the first codified provisions of the nineteenth
century did not specify their rights and duties in any detail.10
As far as codified corporate law is concerned, it was the German
law of the late nineteenth century that first deviated from the onetier model: first, a law reform from 1861 allowed the establishment
of a supervisory board; second, as a substitute for reduced
governmental oversight, the supervisory board was made
mandatory in 1870; and, finally, a further reform from 1884 made
membership of the management and the supervisory board
incompatible.11 Subsequently, this two-tier structure was adopted
by law-makers elsewhere in Europe but also further afield, while
other countries retained the original one-tier structure.12
It may be argued that this stark divide is often blurred in
practice. Today, many large public companies of either model have
board committees of non-executive directors which comprise three
of the core functions of the supervisory board (audit, remuneration,
9
Willem J.L. Calkoen, The One-Tier Board in the Changing and Converging
World of Corporate Governance: A comparative study of boards in the UK, the US
and the Netherlands 307 (Oct. 11, 2011) (Ph.D. thesis, Erasmus University
Rotterdam), https://repub.eur.nl/pub/26502/ [https://perma.cc/K5G3-H7F3].
10
Id. at 307-21. For the current position in the Netherlands see infra Part II.C.
11
See Holger Fleischer, Der Einfluß der Societas Europaea auf die Dogmatik des
deutschen Gesellschaftsrechts, 204 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 502, 523–24
(2004).
12
See, e.g., OECD, OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTBOOK 174 (2021)
[hereinafter OECD FACTBOOK], https://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporategovernance-factbook.htm [https://perma.cc/B729-6HBJ].
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appointment). 13 Moreover, arguably the one-tier model allows
arrangements that make it resemble the two-tier model. There are
two ways of accomplishing this: (i) shareholders can elect only nonexecutive directors to the one-tier board, which leads to a clear split
between the board and executives (in particular if executives
regularly meet as a group) 14 ; or (ii) the articles of association
establish a separate group of “supervisors” charged with
monitoring the conduct of the board. 15 Yet, neither of these two
arrangements would lead to a “true two-tier structure,” as they
would change the rules of codified corporate law that only empower
the board of directors (not any groups of executives or supervisors
created praeter legem).16
Some corporate laws also provide for explicit variants. For
example, in some countries, companies have, or can have, a “board
of (statutory) auditors” (e.g., Italy, Portugal, and Japan), which can
be seen as vestigial version of the supervisory board as it is only
entrusted to check the legality of management but not its business
judgment.17 As with the supervisory board, the origins of this model
go back to late nineteenth century when countries such as Italy and
Japan considered adopting the still “softer” German rules on the
supervisory board of the 1870 law but also blended those with the
use of auditors in one-tier countries (e.g., under French and UK
law).18
13
See, e.g., Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Corporate Boards in Europe–
Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 301, 334-35 (2013) (noting that
these committees are often required by law, listing rules or recommended by
corporate governance codes).
14
For example, in the United States, corporations are typically run by officers,
and there is no requirement that they are members of the board. Today, in many
corporations the only non-independent director is the CEO. Moreover, if there is
no audit committee, the entire board is defined to be the audit committee, which
means that all of its members must be independent. See Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(58)(B), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 205, 116 Stat 745, 773-74.
15
See, e.g., PETRI MÄNTYSAARI, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
SHAREHOLDERS AS A RULE-MAKER 93 (2005) (stating that there is nothing in UK
corporate law that would prevent companies from adopting a two-tier structure
under their articles).
16
Introducing a two-tier structure may theoretically be possible in some onetier jurisdictions, but it would in practice likely be discouraged because of the
absence of a domestic tradition or model.
17
See, e.g., OECD FACTBOOK, supra note 12, at 139, 179.
18
See, e.g., Guido A. Ferrarini, Corporate Governance Changes in the 20th Century:
A View from Italy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES,
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The corporate laws of the Nordic countries are sometimes also
characterized as hybrid models as they require a board of directors
and an executive body (which sometimes can also be a single
person).19 Yet, in contrast to the two-tier model (and the model with
a board of auditors), it is possible to be a member of both of these
bodies; thus, in our view, this Nordic model is better seen as a
variant of the one-tier system 20 since the latter model can also
include a split between executives and non-executives.21
b. The Normative Discussion About Board Models
The main idea of the two-tier model is that a clear division of
management and supervision leads to better control of
management, in particular as it avoids the conflict of interests of

AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 31, 34 (Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch,

Hideki Kanda & Harald Baum eds., 2005) (explaining the Italian’s Commercial
Code’s rules on Companies); Hiroyuki Kansaku, The Role of Shareholders in Public
Companies, in GERMAN AND ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY LAW 243, 247 (Holger
Fleischer, Hideki Kanda, Kon Sik Kim & Peter Mülbert eds., 2016) (explaining the
influence of German and American laws on Japanese corporate law); Bruce
Aronson, Japanese corporate law and corporate governance in historical perspective, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 401, 409–
10 (Harwell Wells ed., 2018) (discussing the “identity crisis” of the board of auditors
given its ambiguous role); Haruhito Takada & Masamichi Yamamoto, The “Roesler
Model” Corporation, 45 J. JAPANESE L. 45, 56-57 (2018) (explaining the board of
auditors provisions under the draft of the Japanese Commercial Code written by
Hermann Roesler). Likewise, the Chinese supervisory board was inspired by the
German model, but was given much smaller powers. See JIANGYU WANG, COMPANY
LAW IN CHINA: REGULATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS IN A SOCIALIST MARKET
ECONOMY 189–91 (2014).
19 E.g., Wolf-Georg Ringe, German versus Nordic Board Models: Form, Function,
and Convergence, 65 NORDIC J. BUSINESS 29 (2016) (providing a comparison between
the Nordic and German approaches to the structure of corporate boards).
20
Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and
International Regulation, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 3, 31 n.109 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt eds.,
2013).
21
In fact, in many publicly traded firms in the United States today (especially
the largest ones) the only non-independent director is the CEO. See SPENCER
STUART, 2019 U.S. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 1, 15 (2019),
https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2019/ssbi2019/us_board_index_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/76XF-LU53] (“The CEO is the
only non-independent director on 62% of S&P 500 boards, an increase from 59%
last year and 50% ten years ago.”).
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executive board members in a one-tier model.22 Scholars have also
argued that one-tier boards with both executive and non-executive
directors have many practical problems: such boards face the risk
of factional disputes,23 and executive board members may withhold
information from the full board, which would result in brief and
superficial board meetings. 24 Finally, from a practical legislative
perspective, the employee co-determination required by some
European jurisdictions 25 can more easily be implemented in
supervisory boards than in boards combining supervision and
management.26
Supporters of the one-tier model present the reverse line of
reasoning. They stress that it is helpful that, in the one-tier model,
executive and non-executive directors can work together in the same
board, in particular as this leads to a faster flow of information and,
therefore, non-executive directors being better informed than
members of the supervisory board.27 Having two boards can also
create fractional disputes between these two boards, as it can lead to
legal uncertainty resulting from the difficulty of distinguishing
between monitoring and strategy setting.28 The supervisory board
in particular may act too conservatively in rejecting good but risky
projects.29 Finally, as a one-tier model is typically implemented with
fewer persons than a two-tier model, it may also be less expensive
for the company.
22
See, e.g., BRIAN CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE, AND
OPERATION 623 (1997) (explaining the “clash of roles” problem within a unitary
board structure); Caspar Rose, The New Corporate Vehicle Societas Europaea (SE):
Consequences for European Corporate Governance, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L
REV. 112, 115–16 (2007) (explaining organization of management in Societas
Europaea).
23
Peter Böckli, Konvergenz: Annäherung des monistischen und des dualistischen
Führungs- und Aufsichtssystems, in HANDBUCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 268 (Peter
Hommelhoff, Klaus J. Hopt & Axel v. Werder eds., 2009).
24
Manuel René Theisen & Michael Hölzl, Corporate Governance, in DIE
EUROPÄISCHE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 310–11 (Manuel René Theisen and Martin Wenz
eds., 2005).
25 See infra Part IV.A.
26 E.g., Klaus J. Hopt & Patrick C. Leyens, The Structure of the Board of Directors:
Boards and Governance Strategies in the US, the UK and Germany, in COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 116, 142 (Afra Afsharipour & Martin Gelter eds., 2021)
(employee co-determination call for a basic governance structure that, from the
viewpoint of private parties, only a two tier-board model can provide).
27
See, e.g., Theisen & Hölzl, supra note 24, at 310.
28
Böckli, supra note 23, at 267-68.
29
Ann B. Gillette, Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello, Board Structures
Around the World: an Experimental Investigation, 12 REV. FIN. 93 (2008).
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The two levels may also differ in the extent to which they permit
shareholders to influence management. At least in the German
version of the two-tier model, the supervisory board is responsible
for appointing and removing members of the management,30 as well
as making other key decisions, for instance about compensation.
Depending on the firm’s ownership structure and the relationship
of the individuals involved, a two-tier model is therefore more likely
to attenuate the direct influence of shareholders on management.31
Overall, it seems that there are good arguments for both models.
It also leads us to the conclusion that (i) comparative empirical
evaluations of different board models should be of interest to legal
scholars and policymakers32 and (ii) that providing companies with
the choice of board models may be a far-sighted strategy, as will be
discussed in the following.
c. The Spread of Board Choice in the EU
Figure 1 displays the “original” and the current models of the
board structures of public companies in Europe (with the precise
law reforms shown in Table 1 below). While historically the vast
majority of the countries only provided for (and allowed) a single
board model, the law has gradually become more liberal in what is
now a majority of Member States.

30
In other countries, shareholders may also have a say. See infra Part IV.A for
the dismissal decision.
31
For this argument see also infra Part IV.A.
32
Most of the existing literature is focused on Anglo-American one-tier firms.
See, e.g., Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of
Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 58, 101 (2010). Empirical research of different board models has
been rare. See Carsten Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance in OneTier and Two-Tier Board Systems—Evidence from the UK and Germany, 3 EUR. CO. &
FIN. L. REV. 426 (2006) (not finding a significant difference). For the limited research
on the “choice countries,” see infra Part III.A.
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Original Model

Onetier

Choice
Audit
Model

Twotier

Cyprus
Greece
Ireland
Malta
Spain
Sweden
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Luxembourg
Romania
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Netherlands
Italy
Portugal
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Slovenia
Austria
Estonia
Germany
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia

Change (If Any)

à 5/1/2019 à
à 3/1/2010 à
à 9/1/1997 à
à 2/1/1967 à
à 8/31/2006 à
à 12/1/2006 à

à 1/1/2013 à
à 1/1/2004 à
à 6/30/2006 à
à 4/1/2008 à
à 1/1/2014 à
à 7/1/2006 à
à 5/4/2006 à
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Current
Model
Cyprus
Greece
Ireland
Malta
Spain
Sweden
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Luxembourg
Romania
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Netherlands
Italy
Portugal
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Slovenia
Austria
Estonia
Germany
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia

Figure 1: Overview of board structures of public companies33
33 For the relevant laws of “choice countries,” see infra Table 1. For one-tier
countries, see: Εταιρειών Νόµος, Κεφάλαιο 113 [Companies Law, Cap. 113]
(Cyprus); Nomos (2190:1920), Περί Ανώνυµων Εταιριών [Law On Companies
Limited by Shares] (Greece); Companies Act 2014 (Act No. 38/2014) (Ir.); Ta]t l-Att
dwar
il-Kumpanniji
[Companies
Act]
Cap.
386,
1995,
https://meae.gov.mt/en/Public_Consultations/MJCL/Documents/Chapter%20
386.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP9D-FPQ8] (Malta); Ley de Sociedades de Capital
[Capital Companies Act] (B.O.E. 2010, 161) (Spain); AKTIEBOLAGSLAGEN (Svensk
Författningssamling [SFS] 2005:551) (Swed.). For two-tier countries, see:
AKTIENGESETZ [AKTG] [STOCK CORPORATION ACT] Bundesgesetz [BG] No. 31/1965,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1965_98_0/1965_98_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJL2-8KXK] (Austria); Äriseadustik [Commercial Code] RIIGI
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The following clarifications need to be made: first, we have
classified Denmark and Finland as original one-tier countries.
Despite the somehow mixed nature of the Nordic model, as
explained, it is best characterized as a variant of the one-tier model.34
Second, Bulgaria and Lithuania have been classified as
“original” choice countries. This is due to the fact that the first
versions of their post-communist corporate laws from the early
1990s already allowed choice of different board models.35 We did
not consider any pre-communist corporate laws, as they are unlikely
to be relevant for companies that exist today.
Third, the Netherlands can, with some hesitation, also be called
a country with original choice. The main complication is that Dutch
law provides different rules for different types of public companies.
Smaller public companies were never restricted in their choice of
board model. For larger public companies (to be precise, those
companies that fall under the so-called “structure regime”), a reform
from 1971 required a supervisory board.36 However, the reform of
2011 (in force since 2013) then again allowed choice of the one-tier
model under certain restrictions for these large public companies
(e.g., requiring non-executive directors), while also clarifying the
use of a one-tier board with both executive and non-executive
members for all companies.
TEATAJA
[RT]
I
1995,
26,
355,
https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/513072016002/consolide/current
[https://perma.cc/FJ8A-83Q9] (Est.); Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation
Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl I at 1089 (Ger.); Komerclikums [The Commercial Law],
LATVIJAS VĒSTNESIS 158/160 (Lat.); Kodeks spółek handlowych [KSH] [The
Commercial Companies Code], Dz.U. tłum. gb Nr 94, poz. 1037 (Pol.); Obchodný
zákonník (ObchZ) [Commercial Code], Act 513/1991 (Slovk.).
34 See supra Part II.A.
35
For the first post-communist corporate law in Bulgaria, see Cheryl W. Gray
& Peter Ianchkov, Bulgaria’s Evolving Legal Framework for Private Sector Development
20-21,
(WBG,
No.
WPS
906,
1992)
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documentsreports/documentdetail/630061468769498484/bulgarias-evolving-legalframework-for-private-sector-development [https://perma.cc/CJ9W-ERR2]. For
Lithuania: Lietuvos Respublikos akcinių bendrovių įstatymas [The Republic of
Lith. Joint Stock Company Law] (Aug. 1 1990), art 17, made the supervisory board
optional for companies with fewer than fifty shareholders and 200 employees
(similar to the Russian corporate law); LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS AKCINIŲ
BENDROVIŲ ĮSTATYMAS [The Republic of Lith. Joint Stock Company Law] ,art.
18(2) (July 20, 1994) later provided choice for all companies.
36
For a summary of the legal evolution since the 1970s, see GREGORY
FRANCESCO MAASSEN, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
MODELS 145–50 (1999). For the prior development, see Calkoen, supra note 9.
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Fourth, Hungary differentiates between two types of public
companies: non-listed public companies (ZRT, zártkörűen működő
részvénytársaság) have complete choice, while for listed public
companies (NYRT, nyilvánosan működő részvénytársaság), the two-tier
structure is the default option which can be replaced by the one-tier
model under certain restrictions. Thus, overall, we regard Hungary
as a choice country today, while prior to 2006 it was a two-tier
country.
Fifth, Italy and Portugal initially had a system with a “board of
auditors” (collegio sindacale in Italian; conselho fiscal or fiscal único in
Portuguese). However, with the respective reforms of the 2000s (see
Table 1), the one and the two-tier models also became available.
Thus, in these two countries, companies can now choose between
three board models: the traditional model with a board of auditors,
the two-tier model with a management and supervisory board, or
the one-tier model with a single board of directors.
Table 1: Relevant laws of “choice countries” (as well as other countries)
Country

Relevant Law Today

Belgium

Code de
Commerce/Wetboek van
Koophandel [Code of
Commerce/Commercial
Code]
/ Code des sociétés et
des associations
[Companies and
Associations Code]
40586/2019.
търговско право
[Commercial Law] DV,
48/Jun. 1991.
Zakon o trgovačkim
društvima [Company
Law] (as amended)

Bulgaria
Croatia
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Choice Enabled, with
Precise Law and Date It
Came into Force
Law of March 23, 2019,
Belgisch Staatsblad [B.S.]
[Belgian Official Journal]
2019/40586. In force since
May 1 2019

N/A
Zakon o trgovačkim
društvima [Company Law]
Narodne novine [NN] [The
people’s newspaper]
107/2007. In force since
April 1, 2008

150
Czech
Republic

Denmark

Finland

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.
Zákon o obchodních
společnostech a
družstvech [Business
Corporations Act], Zákon
č. 90/2012 Sb.
Lov om aktie- og
anpartsselskaber
(Selskabsloven) [Act on
public and private
limited companies
(Companies Act)]
624/2006 Osakeyhtiölain.

France

CODE DE COMMERCE [C.
Com.] [Commerical
Code].

Hungary

Polgári Törvénykönyv
[PTK] [Civil Code] Book
3.

Italy

Codice Civile [C. c.]
[Civil Code].
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Zákon o obchodních
společnostech a družstvech
[Business Corporations
Act], Zákon č. 90/2012 Sb.
Bekendtgoerelse nr. 172 af
01.03.2010 om
selskabsloven. Amendment,
in force since March 1, 2010
145/1997 Laki
osakeyhtiölain
muuttamisesta. In force
since September 1, 1997
Loi 66-537 du 24 juillet 1966
sur les sociétés
commerciales [Law 66-537
of July 24, 1966 on
Commercial Companies],
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE] July 26, 1966
rectificatif J.O. Oct. 19, 1966.
In force since February 1,
1967
1988. évi IV törvény a
gazdasági társaságokról
(Act VI of 1988 on Business
Associations) amended
2006 évi IV törvény a
gazdasági társaságokról
(Act VI of 2006 on Business
Associations). In force since
July 1, 2006
Decreto legislativo 17
gennaio 2003, n. 6, in G.U.
22 gennaio 2003, n. 17. in
force since January 1, 2004
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Lithuania

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Lietuvos Respublikos
akcinių bendrovių
įstatymas [Republic of
Lithuania Law on
Companies] no. VIII-1835
(2000)Law of Companies
2000 (as amended).
Loi Concernat Les
Lociétés Commerciales
[Law on Commercial
Companies] (Règlement
Grand-Ducal] (GrandDucal Regulation) Dec. 5,
2017).
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [C.
Code], 2 Boek [Book 2].

Portugal

CÓDIGO DAS SOCIEDADES
COMERCIAIS [Business
Associations Code].

Romania

Legii Societăților nr. 31
[Companies Law no. 31]
Monitorul Oficial al
României [Official
Gazette of Rom.] no. 583
(Nov. 1990).

Slovenia

Zakon O Gospodarskih
Družbah (ZGD-1)
[Companies Act],
URADNI LIST REPUBLIKE
SLOVENIJE [The Official
Gazette of the Republic
of Slovenia] 2006.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2022

151

N/A

Law of August 25, 2006,
Journal Officiel GrandDuché de Luxembourg
[Official Gazette of GrandDuchy of Luxembourg]
821/2005. In force since
August 31, 2006.
Besluit van 6 juni 2011, Stb.
2011, 275. In force since
January 1, 2013, facilitated
the choice of the one-tier
model.
Decreto-Lei no. 76-A/2006
de 29 de Março 2006
[Decree-Law no. 76A/2006],
https://dre.pt/dre/detalhe
/decreto-lei/76-a-2006620286
[https://perma.cc/94PWSZRD]. In force since June
30, 2006.
Ordinance 441/2006
amending law 31/1990 on
Commercial Companies
published in the Official
Gazette no. 955/28.11.2006.
In force since December 1,
2006.
2006 Act, in force since May
4, 2006.
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Both Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the majority of countries
introduced board choice since the mid 2000s. This is no coincidence
since this reform was often done in conjunction with the
implementation of the law of the European Company (SE, Societas
Europaea). The SE Regulation, which came into force on October 8,
2004, explicitly allows SEs to have “either a supervisory organ and
a management organ (two-tier system) or an administrative organ
(one-tier system) depending on the form adopted in the statutes.”37
Thus, SEs from any country of the EEA (the EU Member States plus
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) can benefit from board choice.
However, incorporation as an SE has strict requirements, such as a
minimum share capital of EUR 120,000, and the need for two or
more existing companies from different EEA countries (which
would then merge, form a holding company, etc.).38 These may not
be significant burdens for very large companies; however, this is
different for the vast majority of public companies, in particular
those that are not listed.39 Thus, less than 0.5% of the about 900,000
public companies established in the EU have the legal form of an SE;
we will therefore only consider the SE at a supplementary level in
this article.
III. THE POPULARITY OF BOARD MODELS ACROSS CHOICE
COUNTRIES
a. Limited Previous Research and Own Data Collection
The previous section has shown that there is both an extensive
debate about the different board models and a growing number of
countries that allow companies the choice of these models; yet,
empirical data on the actual choices that companies make is rare.

37
Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of October 8, 2001 on the Statute for
a European company (SE), art. 38(b).
38
Id. at art. 4(2) and art. 2(1)-(4).
39
For data on the proportion of listed and non-listed public companies, see
infra Part III.B.
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Table 2: Dominant board models in previous studies
Country

LSE
201340
one-tier
two-tier
-

one-tier (ca. 96%)
two-tier (ca. 68%)
two-tier (ca. 100%)
two-tier (ca. 62%)

one-tier
one-tier
one-tier
two-tier

two-tier (ca. 93%)43
two-tier (ca. 93%)45
one-tier (ca. 75%)
two-tier (ca. 100%)

Italy
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands

one-tier
one-tier
one-tier
two-tier

two-tier (ca. 98%)47
two-tier (ca. 75%)
one-tier (ca 65%)
two-tier (ca. 81%)

Portugal

one-tier

one-tier (ca. 62%)51

Romania
Slovenia
SE for all EEA
countries

two-tier
two-tier

one-tier (ca. 87%)
two-tier (ca. 55%)

Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Hungary

EFES 201941

Other
Studies
one-tier42

one-tier44
one-tier46
board of
auditors48
one-tier49
75% one-tier
199550
board of
auditors52

two-tier53

40
LSE ENTERPRISE, STUDY ON DIRECTORS’ DUTIES AND LIABILITY 8 (2013),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50438/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_GernerBeuerle%2C%20C_Study%20on%20directors%E2%80%99%20duties%20and%20lia
bility%28lsero%29 [https://perma.cc/345M-46MF].
41
MARC MATHIEU, EFES, ANNUAL ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EMPLOYEE SHARE
OWNERSHIP
IN
EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
97
(2019),
http://www.efesonline.org/Annual%20Economic%20Survey/2019/Survey%202
019.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL3Q-DZWG] (based on 2,406 large listed companies).
42
Miroslav Mateev, Corporate Governance Problem and its Implications for
Transition Economies, 5 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 335, 339 (2008) (sample from
2004 of large companies—for listed companies: nineteen one-tier and thirteen twotier; for unlisted companies: twenty-two one-tier and eleven two-tier).
43
It seems that this is meant to include the Nordic “hybrid model” (but see
supra Part II.A and II.C).
44
Ringe, supra note 19, at 38 (only very few companies have adopted the twotier model).
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45
It seems that this is meant to include the Nordic “hybrid model” (but see
supra Part II.A and II.C).
46
See François Belot, Edith Ginglinger, Myron B. Slovin & Marie E. Sushka,
Freedom of Choice Between Unitary and Two-Tier Boards: An Empirical Analysis, 112 J.
FIN. ECON. 364, 373 (2014) (SBF 250 companies—seventy-five percent one-tier);
Benedicte Millet-Reyes & Ronald Zhao, A Comparison Between One-Tier and Two-Tier
Board Structures in France, 21 J. INT’L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 279, 292 (2010) (data for
2004: 174 companies, sixty-six percent one-tier; for 1033 publicly traded companies:
91.7% one-tier). A further small-scale study of ninety-five French firms found that
members of the supervisory board have less financial expertise than one-tier board
members. See Thomas Jeanjean & Hervé Stolowy, Determinants of Board Members’
Financial Expertise—Empirical Evidence from France, 44 INT’L J. ACCT. 378 (2008).
47
In this study, it seems that the authors included firms using the board-ofauditors model in the data on two-tier companies.
48
See CAMERA DI COMMERCIO MILANO MONZA BRIANZA LODI, SOCIETÀ E IMPRESA
(2019),
https://www.milomb.camcom.it/database-societario
[https://perma.cc/5W2V-XX4E] (choose “Società e impresa 2019") (data on
companies with alternative board models in Table 4); Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini &
Emiliano Sironi, Does a One-Tier Board Affect Firms’ Performances? Evidences from
Italian Unlisted Enterprises, 48 SMALL BUS. ECON. 213, 219 (2017) (data for 2013 with
46,280 companies: 168 one-tier, 113 two-tier, remainder board of auditors). See also
Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, Laura Pellegrini & Emiliano Sironi, Alternative vs.
Traditional Corporate Governance Systems in Italy: An Empirical Analysis, 8 PROBS. &
PERSP. IN MGMT. 4, 7 (2010) (“the total sample size is composed by 548 firms: 67.7%
of companies adopted a traditional CGS, characterized by one board and an outside
Audit Committee, and 32.3% of them implemented alternative ones”). For listed
companies: CONSOB, REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED
COMPANIES 26 (2019) (data for 2018: 227 companies with audit model, two each for
one-tier and two-tier model).
49
Data are only reported for listed companies: OECD, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN LITHUANIA 31 (2018), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/corporategovernance-in-lithuania-9789264302617-en.htm [https://perma.cc/UR38-7NAT]
(19 out of 29 companies follow one-tier model). See Asta Aleliūnaitė & Ceslovas
Christauskas, Corporate Governance of Lithuanian Listed Companies, 306(73) FOLIA
POMERANAE UNIVERSITATIS TECHNOLOGIAE STETINENSIS 7, 22-26 (2013) (twenty-five
out of forty-six companies follow one-tier model).
50
Maassen, supra note 36, at 146 (7,076 all companies; 1,824 two-tier; 7,453 onetier). See also INSTITUUT VOOR ONDERNEMINGSRECHT, EVALUATIE WET BESTUUR EN
(WETENSCHAPPELIJK
ONDERZOEK,
2017),
https://ncd.nl/wpTOEZICHT
content/uploads/2017/12/Evaluatie-Wet-Bestuur-en-Toezicht.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V6C3-D3HB] (data on board structure of Dutch companies, yet
without identifying their legal form).
51
But this study includes no category for the board-of-auditors model.
52
CMVM, RELATÓRIO ANNUAL SOBRE O GOVERNO DAS SOCIEDADES COTADAS EM
PORTUGAL
9
(2014),
http://www.cmvm.pt/pt/EstatisticasEstudosEPublicacoes/Publicacoes/governo
sociedadescotadas/Documents/Relat%C3%B3rio%20Governo%20Sociedades%20
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLN7-K7AW] (for listed companies: thirty-one board
of auditors; eleven one-tier; one two-tier).
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Table 2 lists some prior studies that have considered the choice
of board systems. However, these studies have severe limitations as
far as the identification of the dominant board model is concerned.
The information in the LSE study is based on the mere opinions of
local lawyers about the dominant model with no data collected, the
EFES study only covers large listed companies and the remaining
studies are also very limited in their coverage. It is therefore no
surprise that these prior studies reach contradictory findings for a
large number of countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Italy,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Romania).
For the purposes of this project, we collected new data using the
database Orbis (Bureau van Dijk).54 The main search was conducted
on July 16, 2018 for the public companies of the fourteen Member
States with board choice at this point in time (thus, excluding
Belgium, which only allowed choice later on). 55 In addition, we
collected data on the board structures of the SEs in all thirty one EEA
countries as of mid-2018 (thus, including the UK).
From Orbis, we downloaded available data for each public
company of these fourteen countries, in particular information
about “directors and managers.” 56 Omitting companies that are
inactive or dormant and removing companies with no meaningful
information about board positions led to a total of 147,268
companies. Orbis does not code the board structure explicitly, but
we developed an algorithm coded in R to determine the board
structure based on the positions of active “directors and managers”
as coded in Orbis. While the Orbis data are not always consistent
across countries, they are consistent within countries. Thus, we had
to determine the right approach to classify boards for each country
53
ANDERS CARLSON, SE EUR. & ETUI, SE COMPANIES 8-9 (2018),
http://www.worker-participation.eu/content/download/6230/103998/file/SEFactsFigures-2018-03-13%20Bologna.pdf [https://perma.cc/62NP-MCDR]; Lars
Hornuf, Abdulkadir Mohamed & Armin Schwienbacher, The Economic Impact of
Forming a European Company, 57 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 659 (2019) (based on 118
observations); Felix Lamp, Value Creation and Value Destruction in the Societas
Europaea: Evidence from the New Legal Form (Apr. 27, 2011) (thesis, Erasmus
University
Rotterdam),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1728162
[https://perma.cc/TLN7-K7AW] (based on forty-seven observations).
54
ORBIS,
https://www.bvdinfo.com/en-us/ourproducts/data/international/orbis [https://perma.cc/A49L-XJ3Z].
55
For Hungary, we included both the ZRT and NYRT. See supra Part II.B. For
France, we only included the SA, not the SAS which is functionally more equivalent
to a private company.
56
Details of the procedure described in this paragraph are explained in a
companion paper that analyses the firm level of this dataset in more detail.
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separately. Ultimately, for most countries it was feasible to treat all
companies with individuals classified as a member of a supervisory
board as two-tier companies, with all other companies classified as
following the one-tier model. Yet, in some countries, terminologies
were not clear (e.g., inconsistency in the use “board of directors” for
either the one-tier board or the two-tier supervisory board) and it
was also necessary to consider the choice of the audit model for Italy
and Portugal, thus necessitating more complex sorting algorithms.
We verified the accuracy of our algorithms by looking up publicly
available information of sample companies online.
Orbis does not code the legal form of an “SE” as separate legal
form in all EU countries. When conducting parallel searches for all
EEA countries, merely searching for “SE” in the company name
would lead to false positives. Thus, we employed the widely used
ECDB database for SEs57 as a starting point as it explicitly states the
board model of each SE. This database covered 3,017 companies (as
of May 25, 2018) and it includes information about the board
structure. However, as the ECDB database contains little further
firm-level information, we matched these findings with Orbis data
for these companies. This resulted in firm-level data for almost
ninety percent of these SEs or 2,630 companies.
b. Cross-Country Findings of this Study
Using our own data, as outlined in the previous sub-section,
Table 3 presents the general preference for one of the two—and for
Italy and Portugal, one of the three—board models for the public
companies of the fourteen countries of our study.

57
Eur. Co. Database, ETUI,
[https://perma.cc/J89T-NQMU].
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Table 3: General data about public companies
Number of Firms by
Board Structure
Country

Onetier

Twotier

Bulgaria
8,539
57
Croatia
20
635
Czech Rep.
4,115 13,070
Denmark
35,316
31
Finland
239
7
France
14,962
93
Hungary
4,191 1,576
Italy
100
71
Lithuania
265
15
Luxembourg 7,025
28
Netherlands
2,726
550
Portugal
24
4
Romania
3,161 3,583
Slovenia
110
380

Board of
Auditors
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
24,010
n/a
n/a
n/a
22,367
n/a
n/a

Further Information
Total
Percentage of
Number of
Listed
Public
Companies
Companies
8,596
2.58%
655
22.75%
17,185
0.08%
35,347
0.43%
246
58.94%
15,055
3.93%
5,767
0.66%
24,181
1.18%
280
10.71%
7,053
0.95%
3,276
4.79%
22,395
0.23%
6,744
5.10%
490
7.14%

In addition to variations in the choice of board models, Table 3
shows that the total number of public companies varies considerably
between jurisdictions. In some countries, we have data for fewer
than 1,000 public companies (Croatia, Finland, Lithuania, Slovenia),
while in others there are more than 10,000 (Czech Republic,
Denmark, France, Italy, Portugal). These discrepancies are likely to
reflect the size of the respective economies as well as different
preferences of small and medium-sized businesses in the use of the
form of a private or public company.58 They may also be due to the
substance of the underlying legal rules: for example, in many
countries, the rules for private and public companies differ in the
fundamental question whether corporate law provides a set of
default or mandatory rules.59
58
For the fact that different types of firms are comprised in our data, see infra
Part IV.A.
59
Eddy Wymeersch, Comparative Study of the Company Types in Selected EU
States, 6 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 71, 88-97 (2009).
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The exceptional Finnish situation with a low number of public
companies is owed to the history of Finnish corporate law: here,
separate forms for public and private companies were only
introduced in 1997 and the rules for both forms are still largely
identical 60 ; however, due to requirements of EU law, minimum
capital requirements are considerably higher for public companies.61
Thus, in Finland the only reason for choosing the form of a public
company is to be able to get listed on a stock exchange. It is therefore
not surprising that almost sixty percent of Finnish public companies
are listed companies. By contrast, in most of the other countries of
our study only few public companies are listed (see Table 3): thus,
for the data analyzed in this study, it is worth keeping in mind that,
while it concerns public companies, the vast majority of these
companies (98.5%) are privately held.62

60
Manne Airaksinen & Tom Berglund, Corporate Governance in Finland, in THE
NORDIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL 168-69 (Per Lekvall ed., 2014).
61
Id. (for the Finnish law requiring 80,000 EUR of minimum capital for public
companies, as compared to 25,000 EUR for private companies). Note that EU law
only requires minimum capital for public companies, as stated in Directive (EU)
2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017 relating
to certain aspects of company law, art. 45 (previously in the 2nd Company Law
Directive). 2017 O.J. (L 169) 70.
62 See infra Part IV.A.
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Figure 2: Choice of board models in public companies
For the purposes of comparing the “pure” choices, it is helpful
to present the percentage of the total number of public companies
for each of the countries: Figure 2 shows that, despite the
availability of choice, some countries have a clearly dominant
model: in Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Portugal
more than ninety-nine percent of the companies choose the same
board model. There is somewhat more diversity in Croatia, Finland,
Italy and Lithuania with one model that prevails with more than
ninety-nine but less than ninety-nine percent. By contrast, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands,63 Romania and Slovenia have
a more balanced choice with no model used by more than ninety
percent of the firms (and thus possibly a “true competition” between
the different models).
In substance, it follows from Figure 2 that there is considerable
diversity in choices between the one-tier or the two-tier model, while
the board-of-auditors model has remained preeminent in Italy and
63
In the Netherlands, our data do not distinguish between “structure regime”
(see supra Part II.C) or other companies. This means that smaller firms that have a
unitary board without different categories of directors are classified as one-tier
firms (as they are in other countries).
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Portugal. This result may be read as confirmation of the view that,
perhaps, the one- and two-tier models operate similarly in practice
and there is no clear benefit in choosing either of them.64 Yet, the
analysis of the subsequent section will also identify that there are
indeed several substantive reasons that account for choices of these
models at the country level.
Comparing the number of countries with above fifty percent
choice of either the one-tier or for the two-tier model, one-tier has an
advantage of 8:4. This may reflect the preference of small and
medium-sized businesses for the simpler one-tier structure. If we
focus on the 2,280 companies (1.5% of our data, see also Table 3) that
are listed, two-tier gains more support in almost all of the countries,
with Hungary and the Netherlands now being predominantly twotier countries (with 76.3% and 70.1%). 65 The main anomaly is
Romania, where the two-tier model is more popular for unlisted
than for listed companies (55.1% compared to 16.3%).66
Considering the SE data for the same fourteen countries, we face
the problem that only very few SEs have been established in most
jurisdictions, with only four countries having more ten of them.
Here, the general breakdown among the models is the same as in
Figure 1: in the Czech Republic (the place where more than half of
all SEs have been established 67 ) two-tier leads with ninety-seven
percent, while in the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg one-tier
prevails with fifty-eight percent, seventy-six percent, and eighty
percent. These latter figures are lower than the ones for domestic
public companies (see Figure 1); thus, they may reflect the
international nature of these SEs. Yet, these differences should also
not be over-interpreted as they are only based on small numbers of
companies (e.g., in France four two-tier SEs and thirteen one-tier
SEs.

See supra Part II.A, II.B.
Also, note the different rules for large companies in both countries: see supra
Part II C.
66
For a possible explanation, see infra Part IV.D.
67
For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Horst Eidenmüller & Jan Lasák,
The Czech Societas Europaea Puzzle, 12 J. CORP. L. STUD. 237, 237 (2012).
64
65
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Figure 3: Board structures of SEs divided by domestic board models
The bar chart of Figure 3 displays the board choice of SEs for all
thirty-one EEA countries, based on the classification of their current
domestic board models.68 It shows that only ten percent of SEs from
one-tier countries have chosen two-tier for the SE, while forty
percent of SEs from two-tier countries apparently find the one-tier
structure more attractive.69 A possible interpretation is that for these
latter companies the ability to choose the one-tier model has been
one of the reasons why the legal form of the SE has been chosen in
the first place, 70 i.e., the data may reflect a desire of two-tier
companies to switch to the one-tier model.71

See supra Part II.A.
The two-tier preference for the “choice countries” is entirely driven by the
Czech Republic, as indicated in the preceding paragraph.
70
As also confirmed by Hornuf et al., supra note 53, at 669.
71 See infra Part IV.D.
68
69
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IV. WHAT MAY EXPLAIN COUNTRY VARIATIONS IN PREFERRED
BOARD MODELS?
a. Possible Reasons for Different Preferences Across Countries
This section explores reasons for variation in the preferred board
model between the countries that allow the choice for domestic
public companies (i.e., not merely the SE). Thus, the units of analysis
are the fourteen countries (as displayed in Figure 2 above). Given
this low number of observations, inferential statistics such as
regression analysis would not be feasible. 72 It would also be
unrealistic to expect that other quantitative tools could provide
determinative evidence of a causal relationship. Yet, this does not
mean that it is impossible to explore reasons and develop
hypotheses for differences between the fourteen countries. For this
purpose, this section will use two other formal analytical methods,
namely correspondence analysis and fuzzy-set qualitative
comparative analysis (see IV.B and IV.C below), in order to gain
some general insights. It then follows up with an exploration of
idiosyncratic factors (see IV.D below).
Before doing so, this sub-section aims to identify possible reasons
why a particular board model may be more popular in some
countries than in others.

72
In regression models and more generally in statistical inference, a larger
number of observations allows a researcher to make more precise estimates. A
larger sample size will result in a smaller standard error, which allows a researcher
to construct a narrower confidence interval and make it more likely to reject a null
hypothesis. In other words, we are more likely to see statistically significant results
with a larger sample size. On confidence intervals and hypothesis testing, see, for
example, DAVID DIEZ, MINE ÇETINKAYA-RUNDEL & CHRISTOPHER D. BARR, OPENINTRO
STATISTICS 181–201 (4th ed. 2019).
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Figure 4: Choice of board models by traditional model
A first possible explanation for the differences between countries
is that the traditional board model of a country, which now allows
for choice today, may still reflect the preferences of the companies
first established in that country. Thus, Figure 4 regroups the country
differences (see Figure 2) according to the traditional models, 73
which indeed seems to show that they continue to matter to some
extent.

73

See supra Part III.B.
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Table 4: Legal variation in countries with board choice – selected topics

No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

No
Yes

Available

0
0.33
0.2
0.1
0.33
0
0
0.33
0.33
0
0
0.5

0
0.1

Maximum

50
35
150
1000
200
1000
100
50

1

Threshold

Employee codetermination

No
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Minimum members
for two-tier boards:

Management
3
3

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

Country74

Supervisory
1
1

1
3
1
3
1
4
3
3
1
2
1
3

Shareholders
can dismiss
management
board in twotier model

3
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

Special
provisions
about
executives
in one-tier
model

Bulgaria75
Croatia76
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
3
3
3

Minimum
members
for one-tier
board (or
audit
model)

Czech Republic77
Denmark78
Finland79
France80
Hungary81
Italy82
Lithuania83
Luxembourg84
Netherlands85
Portugal86
Romania87
Slovenia88
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Secondly, legal variations may be a factor that explains
differences in board choice. This does not mean that we need to
consider all possible rules that address corporate boards. Since very
few of the public companies in our dataset are listed (1.5%, see Table
3 and accompanying text above) rules that mainly or only apply to
listed firms (e.g., about independent directors, board committees,
gender diversity, executive remuneration, and compliance with
74
Footnotes 75–88 report the relevant provisions for the first five columns of
Table 4. For the relevant laws, see supra Table 1. For the final three columns, which
deal with employee co-determination, see Hornuf et al., supra note 53, and List of
Countries under National Industrial Relations, WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU,
https://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries
[https://perma.cc/298K-BVAC].
75
търговско право [Commercial Law] arts. 242(2), 241(4), 244, n/a, Arts. 221
and 233 (Bulg.).
76
Zakon o trgovačkim društvima [Company Law] arts. 254, 239, 272b, 272.l,
244 (Croat.).
77
Zákon o obchodních společnostech a družstvech [Business Corporations
Act] 90/2012 Sb. Sec. 448(1), 439(1), 457, 463, 438(1) (Czech).
78
Lov om aktie- og anpartsselskaber (Selskabsloven) [Act on public and private limited companies (Companies Act)] (Mar. 2010), Art. 111 (Den.).
79
Osakeyhtiölaki [Companies Act] 6 Luku [Ch. 6] 624/2006, sec..23, 8, 8, n/a,
13 Companies Act (Fin.).
80
CODE DE COMMERCE [C. Com.] [Commerical Code] Arts. L225-69, L225-58
(at least for small companies), L225-17, L225-56, L 225-61 (Fr.).
81
Polgári Törvénykönyv [PTK] [Civil Code] arts. 3:26 and 3:121, 3:77 (but three
for listed companies, art. 3:282), 3:77 (but five for listed companies, art. 3:282), n/a,
3:120 (Hung.).
82
Codice Civile [C. c.] [Civil Code] arts. 2409-duodecies, 2409-nonies, 2397
(and 2409-octiesdecies: one director and three committee members), n/a, 2409terdecies (It.).
83
Company Law 1994 supra, note 35, arts. 31(2), 33(2), 33, 37, 33(10) (Lith.).
84 Loi Concernat Les Lociétés Commerciales [Law on Commercial Companies]
(Règlement Grand-Ducal] (Grand-Ducal Regulation) Dec. 5, 2017) arts. 442-14, 4412, 441-2, 441-11, 442-5 (Lux.).
85
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [C. Code], arts. 2:140, n/a, n/a, n/a, 2:147 (dismissal
by general meeting possible if provided in the articles) (Neth.); see also the special
rules for companies that need to follow the “structure regime” (cf. supra Part II.C),
for example, on the number of supervisory board members and their appointment
and dismissal: arts. 2:158, 2:162.
86
CÓDIGO DAS SOCIEDADES COMERCIAIS [Business Associations Code], arts.
413(4), 424, 390 (one director and single auditor), n/a, 430 (Port.).
87
Legii Societăților nr. 31 [Companies Law no. 31] Monitorul Oficial al
României [Official Gazette of Rom.] no. 583 (Nov. 1990) arts. 153.6, 153 (but three if
audited), 137 (but three if audited), 143, 153.2.
88
Zakon O Gospodarskih Družbah (ZGD-1) [Companies Act], URADNI LIST
REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE [The Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia] 2006, arts.
254, 265, 290, 268.
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corporate governance codes) are unlikely to be a relevant factor in
our case. Moreover, because this section explores the reasons for the
degree of popularity of board models in a given country, rules which
are typically identical or similar for different board structures within
the same country (e.g., the definition and enforcement of directors’
duties) are also not relevant here.
Table 4 outlines some of the core differences in corporate law
and employee co-determination that could potentially be relevant.89
The first three columns are based on the possibility that needing to
find and pay more members for the board (or boards) may be seen
as a burden. By contrast, we did not consider provisions on the
maximum number of board members as they are likely to be
relevant for only the small number of very large companies and thus
not general preferences at the country level.
The subsequent two variables consider that the design of board
model may dilute the “pure” versions of the one-tier and two-tier
model. 90 Thus, the next column is about special provisions
addressing the role of executives in the one-tier model, for example,
specifying the applicable appointment procedure, the duration of
appointment and their scope of responsibilities. Potentially, this can
weaken the appeal of just having a single board as it imposes legal
rules for two groups of persons (board members and executives),
akin to the two-tier model.91 In some jurisdictions using the two-tier
model the supervisory board may be rather weak (and, thus in some
respects, rather like the hybrid board-of-auditors model).
Specifically, the two-tier model may be more burdensome than the
one-tier model if it means that shareholders cannot appoint or
dismiss the members of the management board. In companies with
large shareholders, it can also be relevant as the two-tier model can
then serve their entrenched interests vis-à-vis changing positions in
89 For discussion of additional legal variations, see, for example, Hanjo
Hamann, Unpacking the Board A Comparative and Empirical Perspective on Groups in
Corporate Decision-Making, 11 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1 (2014); Eur. Parl. Doc. (PE
462.454),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2012/462454/IP
OL-JURI_ET(2012)462454_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB3H-GNUA] (study by
the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs on “Relations between
company supervisory bodies and the management’); OECD FACTBOOK, supra note
12, at 139–242.
90
For the general difference between board models, see supra Part II.A.
91
This topic was discussed in Germany in detail when the government
introduced the one-tier model for the SE. See, e.g., ANSGAR SCHÖNBORN, DIE
MONISTISCHE SOCIETAS EUROPAEA IN DEUTSCHLAND IM VERGLEICH ZUM ENGLISCHEN
RECHT (2007).
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the shareholder meeting. While the two-tier model historically left
this question to the articles of association, a reform of German law
from 1937 mandated that only the supervisory board had the power
to appoint and dismiss members of the management board. 92
Countries following this model are coded as “no” in the above table,
whereas jurisdictions where shareholders can always remove
management board members, or where it depends on the articles,
are coded as “yes.”93
Finally, the last three columns of Table 4 reflect that it could be
relevant that employee co-determination can more easily be
implemented in supervisory boards than in boards which combine
supervision and management. 94 Thus, these columns report the
general availability of co-determination, their maximum level in
terms of required employee board-members and the threshold of the
number of employees triggering the applications of these rules.

92
Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Jan. 30, 1937, RGBl. I at 120,
§ 75(1) (Ger.). On the political context and the goal of reducing the influence of
shareholders, see Thilo Kuntz, German Corporate Law in the 20th Century, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 205, 216-19 (Harwell
Wells ed., 2018).
93
It depends on the articles in the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and the
Netherlands. See supra Table 1. Other topics related to the dismissal of directors
(e.g., whether cause is needed) are typically the same for different board models
within each country.
94
See supra Part II.B.
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Table 5: Firm-level variations for public companies—selected mean
data

Number of Number of
Directors95 Employees
Country
Bulgaria
3.37
82.02
Croatia
6.84
318.59
Czech Rep.
2.43
96.29
Denmark
4.81
83.29
Finland
26.59
2,287.77
France
9.42
496.51
Hungary
6.18
127.87
Italy
9.36
243.42
Lithuania
4.29
293.00
Luxembourg
3.82
283.64
Netherlands
5.37
1,636.68
Portugal
5.21
82.14
Romania
5.54
114.42
Slovenia
6.11
331.66
Total
5.83
182.74

Largest
Total
Number of
Share- Assets (in
Shareholder holder Thousand
s96
(in %) s of USD)
2.68
75.12
17,645
4.39
62.34
76,033
0.49
97.41
38,323
1.79
79.33
54,212
24.78
42.60 2,246,458
2.53
70.35
251,048
1.24
86.07
59,328
9.17
66.48
140,059
2.22
69.87
236,995
1.84
78.49
181,830
2.11
86.70
466,732
1.67
72.54
44,161
3.83
74.80
18,854
3.56
63.18
189,027
3.10
75.69
102,215

Thirdly, additional reasons for variations in preferences may be
due to the fact that different types of firms are incorporated as public
companies in the fourteen countries. Table 5 reports some of the
descriptive statistics of the firm-level data.97 For example, it could
matter that categories such as the number of directors, employees
and shareholders, the prevalence of large shareholders and the total
assets of the company may have an impact on board choice.98 These
categories are also correlated with each other: for example, we
already noted that in Finland, but not in the other countries, many
of the public companies are listed companies. Thus, it is also
plausible that, according to Table 5, Finnish companies have the
95
As reported in Orbis, supra note 54 (namely in its category “number of
current directors & managers,” which also includes some top-level executives).
96
This column only includes information about known shareholders. In
particular, in the Czech Republic, there seems to be either missing data in Orbis or
a large number of shelf companies.
97
As collected from Orbis, see supra Part III.A.
98
This will also be analyzed in a firm-level focused companion paper.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss1/3

2021]

Letting Companies Choose Between Board Models

169

largest numbers of directors, employees and shareholders, the
lowest ownership concentration, and the highest total assets.99

99
In addition, this information would be correlated with the preference of
SMEs for one of the two types of companies (a private company or a public
company). For this topic, see also Wymeersch, supra note 59.
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Entrenched 2Tier

0.5
1
1
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
0.25
0.5
0.25
0.75
0.25
0.25
0.75

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0

Audit
model
available

0.33
0.33
1
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
0
0.33
0.33
1
0.33
0.33
0.33

Few
persons
for
2Tier
needed
0.33
0.33
1
0.33
1
0.33
1
0
0.33
0.33
1
0.66
1
0.33

Few
persons
for
1Tier
needed

1
1
0.5
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
0
1

Few
persons
comparison

1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0

Executives in
1Tier
voluntary

0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0

Shareholder
power
remains
in 2Tier

0
0.5
0.5
1
0.5
0.5
0.5
0
0
0.5
0.5
0
0
1

Strong
codetermination

0.25
0.5
0
0
1
0.25
0
0.5
0.25
0
0
0.25
0.25
0.5

Minority
shareholder
ownership

Table 6: Country coding of possible reasons for country differences
Country

Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Hungary
Italy
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
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For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we had to code the
relevant variables of Tables 3 and 4 at a scale from 0 to 1, as
displayed in Table 6. In particular, this was necessary for the
subsequent use of the fuzzy-set qualitiative comparative analysis
method as it requires the researcher to specify “membership scores”
indicating whether units belong, or partly belong, to these
categories.100 Table 6 therefore codes the following information: (i)
the variable on “entrenched two-tier” considers the traditional
board model of the country and length of time choice has been
available101; (ii) a binary variable codes for Italy and Portugal the
availability of a “third model”; (iii) three variables code the number
of persons needed for the two models 102 ; and (iv) two binary
variables reflect the abovementioned rules on “special provisions
about executives in one-tier model” and “shareholders can dismiss
management board in two-tier model.” 103 Finally, the table
includes: (v) a variable on strong employee co-determination104; and
(vi), as a representative condition from the firm-level data of Table
5 (other conditions were also tested), the data on the mean of the
largest shareholders.105

100

FOR THE

(2012).

CARSTEN Q. SCHNEIDER & CLAUDIUS WAGEMANN, SET-THEORETIC METHODS
SOCIAL SCIENCES: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 27–30

101
Coded as: 1 = traditional two-tier, only recent choice (with recent defined
as 2010s); 0.75 = traditional two-tier, medium-term choice (defined as 1995-2009);
0.5 = long-term choice; 0.25 = traditional one-tier/board of auditors, medium-term
choice; 0 = traditional one-tier/board of auditors, only recent choice. Note for
Netherlands: 0.5 for small companies and 1 for large companies = coded as 0.75
overall.
102
Coded as follows: (i) for two tier: 1 = two persons; 0.33 = four persons; 0 =
five persons; (ii) for one tier: 1 = one person; 0.66 = two persons; 0.33 = three
persons; 0 = four persons; (iii) comparison: 1 if two does not require more than 1.5
more persons than one-tier; 0.5 if it requires twice as many persons; 0 if it requires
four times as many persons.
103
Coded as in supra Table 4.
104
Coded as 1 for co-determination unless threshold 100 or higher or ten
percent or lower participation rate when it was coded as 0.5; 0 for countries without
co-determination.
105
Coded as: 1 for the lowest level of concentration (<50%), then 0.5 (<66.66%),
then 0.25 (<80%), and 0 for the highest level of concentration (>80%).
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b. Correspondence Analysis
Correspondence analysis is an explorative statistical technique106
that aims at generating a graphical mapping of data that was
originally developed for two-way contingency tables, but can be
used for any data matrix with non-negative entries.107 Historically,
correspondence analysis has often been used in linguistics,108 social
sciences109 and business studies (e.g., in marketing).110 It can also be
used to analyze multiple response tables, for example to describe the
results of a qualitative survey where the rows represent survey
respondents or groups of survey respondents that share a
characteristic of interest. The columns thus represent specific words
or groups of ideas that came up for respondents.111 The data are
transformed into a low-dimensional vector space,112 meaning that
they can be plotted in a low number of (in simple cases just two)
dimensions, which permits a relatively intuitive interpretation.
To our knowledge, correspondence analysis has not yet been
used as a tool for comparative law, for which we have adapted the
method. We modified the technique to code “country groups” as
row profiles (as explained in the next paragraph) and the legal and
practical characteristics (as in Table 6, above) as column profiles.
Thus, compared to correspondence analysis of a qualitative survey
with open-ended questions, we have substituted countries for
survey respondents, and replaced survey responses to our coding of
106
This means that correspondence analysis does not test data against a
theoretical model or hypothesis, but allows a researcher to see patterns in the data
that will hopefully result in a better understanding and possibly the generation of
hypotheses. See MICHAEL GREENACRE, CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS IN PRACTICE 7
(3rd ed. 2017).
107
See Hervé Abdi & Michel Béra, Correspondence Analysis, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AND MINING 1 (R. Alhajj, J. Rokne eds., 2017).
108
On the historical origins in linguistics, see MICHAEL GREENACRE, THEORY
AND APPLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS 9-11 (1984).
109 E.g., Julia M. Puaschunder, On the Social Representations of Intergenerational
Equity, 4 ACRN OXFORD. J. FIN & RISK. PERSP. 78 (2015).
110
E.g., Donna L. Hoffman & George R. Franke, Correspondence Analysis:
Graphical Representation of Categorical Data in Marketing Research, 23 J. MKTG. RSCH.
213 (1986).
111
For a socio-legal application (possibly the only one in the legal literature),
see Bernard E. Harcourt, Measured Interpretation: Introducing the Method of
Correspondence Analysis to Legal Studies, U. ILL. L. REV. 979 (2002) (coding a survey
about the social meaning of guns among youths).
112
MICHAEL GREENACRE, THEORY AND APPLICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE
ANALYSIS 54 (1984).
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legal and practical features of each country’s corporate governance
system.
Since we are not interested in features of individual countries,
but whether the features represented by the column profiles are
associated with specific outcomes, we consolidated the countries
into groups showing the “dominant model”: in four countries the
two-tier model dominates with a percentage of more than fifty
percent; in four additional countries the one-tier model prevails with
more than fifty percent, but there is a sizable number of two-tier
firms; finally, in six countries the traditional one-tier or audit model
was chosen by more than ninety-nine percent of companies, leaving
only a minute number of two-tier firms.113 Thus, for the actual c
orrespondence analysis this information was adapted by taking
averages within each group.114
To map the data graphically, the correspondence analysis
algorithm computes how each row and each column influences the
distribution of the result in two dimensions. In our case (see Figure
5, below), Dimension 1 explains 72.05% of the variation, while
Dimension 2 explains the remaining 27.95%. Generally speaking,
row profiles (and correspondingly, column profiles) that are close to
each other have similar effects.115 Column and row profiles can be
interpreted in relation to each other when a so-called asymmetric
plot is used in which one type of profile is normalized to the same
scale as the respective other types of profile.116 We use a modified
type of asymmetric profile, specifically a column-based contribution
biplot as recommended by Greenacre. 117 With this method,
coordinates are weighted according to the inertia of each
observation. Thus, row variables that influence the distribution
because of their high variation more strongly appear farther away
from the origin.

113
Specifically, the coding is therefore: “2Tier >50%” for Croatia, Czech
Republic, Romania and Slovenia; “1Tier/audit>50%” for Finland, Hungary,
Lithuania and Netherlands; “1Tier/audit>99%” for Bulgaria, Denmark, France,
Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal.
114
For example, the average for entrenched two-tier among countries within
the “2Tier > 50%” category is (1+1+0.25+.75)/4 = 0.75.
115
See Abdi & Béra, supra note 107, at 5.
116
See Abdi & Béra, supra note 107, at 6.
117
See Michael Greenacre, Contribution Biplots, 22 J. COMPUTATIONAL &
GRAPHICAL STAT. 107 (2013).
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While the results of correspondence analysis can be presented
numerically,118 they can be more intuitively interpreted in a
graphical map. Figure 5 can be interpreted as follows: rows
(country groupings) indicated with black triangles are associated
with columns (legal and practical factors within the countries)
shown with gray circles that lie on a similar direction from the
origins.119 In other words, the smaller the angle between a line from
the origin to the point representing the country group and the line
from the origin to the point representing factor of interest, the more
associated the factor is with the country group. For example,
countries where more than fifty percent of firms follow the two-tier
model are relatively likely to have an entrenched two-tier system. If
a row profile and a column profile are on opposite side of the plot,
the association tends to be negative. Note that these associations do
not represent statistical significance, and that the associations shown
are only relative to the other country groupings and points. Points
representing column profiles lying further away from the origin are
more important for differentiating the rows from each other than
points close to the origin.

Figure 5: Column-based contribution biplot of correspondence analysis

118
119

Available from the authors upon request.
See Greenacre, supra note 112, at 6.
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Figure 5 shows the results of the two dimensions graphically.
The first dimension (along the x-axis) separates principally countries
where the majority of public companies use the two-tier model and
countries where the one-tier or board-of-auditors model prevails
overwhelmingly. The second, less important dimension (along the
y-axis) distinguishes countries where the one-tier model dominates
less strongly.
While correspondence analysis only interprets a contingency
table graphically and does not tell us whether a relationship is
statistically significant, it is possible to perform certain checks to
determine how stable the results are, and whether they are driven
by idiosyncratic factors in specific countries. One such technique is
the so-called “jackknife,” where each observation is removed in turn
to see whether the results change. We therefore re-ran the analysis
fourteen times with a different country removed each time to see
whether single countries strongly influenced the placement of row
profiles. Another technique is the “bootstrap”, where the analysis
in question is re-run by repeatedly taking samples from the data
(with replacement). We performed the bootstrap by taking 1000
samples out of the fourteen countries (with replacement) and
checked how the points for each column profile were typically
placed. If a point frequently does not stay close to its location in our
main analysis, the original result is less credible.120
In our main analysis shown in Figure 5, “Entrenched 2Tier,”
“Strong co-determination” and “Few persons needed for 2Tier” are
most associated with the prevalence of the row profile indicating
widespread use of the two-tier model. This is not surprising because
these variables indicate a strong tradition of the two-tier model as
well as the reduction of two possibly disadvantages, namely the
possibility to restrict employee representatives to a supervisory
board, and a relatively low cost of the board structure. The
bootstrap suggests that the results are most stable for “Entrenched
2Tier.” In our main model, this is also the column profile with the
third highest inertia (0.017), which is indicated by the distance to the
origin in the contribution biplot. The inertias of the other variables
120
On the use of jackknifing and bootstrapping for correspondence analysis,
see Greenacre, supra note 112, at 210–19. Some of the more recent literature has
suggested creating confidence ellipses based on bootstraps. See ERIC J. BEH &
ROSARIA LOMBARDO, CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS: THEORY, PRACTICE AND NEW
STRATEGIES 315–17 (2014). We did not use these techniques on the column variables
because our main interest was to check whether our results were driven by the
choice of countries.
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that show up close to the origin are still weaker (< 0.01). The “strong
codetermination” variable appears to be in the same direction of the
“2Tier >50%” row profile mainly because of the inclusion of
Slovenia. As shown by jackknifing, when Slovenia is omitted, the
profile “strong co-determination” appears to the left of the origin.
The “Audit model available” column profile, which has the
highest inertia in the model (0.087), is strongly associated with
“1Tier/audit > 99%” because both countries that have this variable
(Italy and Portugal) fall into the latter category. The results are very
stable to our robustness tests.
“Executives in 1Tier voluntary,” the variable with the second
highest inertia (0.058), seems to be associated with both row profiles
indicating a majority use of the 1Tier or audit model. In most
bootstrap samples, the column profile appears relatively far out in
the bottom left quadrant, although in 4.3% of bootstraps it appears
in the bottom right quadrant, and in 9.3% in the (lower portion) of
the top right quadrant. With the jackknife (where countries are
omitted in turn), it consistently remains in the top left quadrant. In
combination, this seems to suggest that this variable tends to be
associated with the use of the one-tier or audit model. By contrast,
other variables seem to yield less consistent results, and they have
little influence on the variability in the model.
In summary, correspondence analysis supports an
interpretation of board choices in the fourteen countries largely been
driven by tradition: while all variables associated with a high
prevalence of the two-tier model are rather weak, “Entrenched
2Tier” seems to matter most for its prevalence in our fourteen
jurisdictions. The availability of the audit model pulls countries
most strongly into the opposite direction, i.e., the overwhelming use
of either the one-tier or “board of auditors” model. In combination,
these results indicate the importance of path dependence for board
choice: countries are most likely to use the two-tier or the audit
model because it has traditionally been available.
“Executives voluntary in 1Tier” is the most important
substantive legal variable (given the second highest inertia). Its
location across the origin from “2Tier >50%” and between
“1Tier/audit>50%” and “1Tier/audit>99%” could be read as that it
pulls countries into the direction of the one-tier model. Arguably, if
a country requires firms to appoint executives separately from the
board, the latter model often approximates the two-tier model in
practice. Thus, it would erode a key difference between the one-tier
and two-tier models. By contrast, if the appointment of executive
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can be avoided, especially small firms are not subject to a potentially
costly bureaucratic requirement.
c. Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) is a
technique that formalizes the logic of Boolean algebra. It has become
a popular method across many academic disciplines, notably in
political science 121 and management studies (including corporate
governance research),122 while examples from legal scholarship are
still rare.123
FsQCA differs from inferential statistics such as regression
analysis as it does not require a large number of observations and a
small number of explanatory variables, i.e., it can work with a small
number of observations and a relatively large number of
explanatory factors (in the fsQCA terminology: “conditions”).
More specifically, it aims to “facilitate a dialogue between theory

121
See, e.g., Eva Thomann, Customizing Europe: Transposition as Bottom-Up
Implementation, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1368 (2015) (discussing how European Union
(EU) member states adapt EU directives to domestic contexts using fuzzy-set
qualitative comparative analysis); Axel Marx, Benoît Rihoux & Charles Ragin, The
Origins, Development, and Application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis: The First 25
Years, 6 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 115 (2014) (explaining the origins of the ideas behind the
qualitative comparative analysis).
122 See, e.g., Ilir Haxhi & Ruth V. Aguilera, An Institutional Configurational
Approach to Cross-National Diversity in Corporate Governance, 54 J. MGMT. STUD. 261
(2017) (explaining corporate governance patterns using fuzzy-set logic); Roberto
García-Castro, Ruth V. Aguilera & Miguel A. Ariño, Bundles of Firm Corporate
Governance Practices: A Fuzzy Set Analysis, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE 390 (2013)
(exploring how combinations of corporate governance practice in different national
governance systems led to high firm performance using fuzzy-set/qualitative
comparative analysis).
123 See, e.g., T.T. Arvind & Lindsay Stirton, Explaining the Reception of the Code
Napoleon in Germany: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, 30 LEGAL STUD. 1
(2010) (explaining the reception of the Code Napoleon in Germany using fuzzy-set
qualitative comparative analysis); Pablo José Castillo Ortiz, Councils of the Judiciary
and Judges’ Perceptions of Respect to Their Independence in Europe, 9 HAGUE J. RULE OF
LAW 315 (2017) (discussing the perceptions of European Judges of respect to Judicial
Councils in Europe with the aid of multi-value qualitative comparative analysis);
Catalina Goanta & Mathias Siems, What Determines National Convergence of EU Law?
Measuring the Implementation of Consumer Sales Law, 39 LEGAL STUD. 714 (2019)
(discussing determinants for national convergence of European Union law applies
to European consumer sales law using the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis method).
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and evidence” 124 ; thus, it also asks researchers to use qualitative
skills and knowledge in research design and evaluation. The results
of fsQCA show how different pathways (i.e., combinations of certain
conditions) can lead to the same outcome of interest. It is therefore
argued that fsQCA’s ability to account for causal complexity is one
of its key advantages (i.e., it does not simply assume that the same
conditions matter for all observations). 125 FsQCA thus illustrates
actual associations between causal pathways and outcomes that
were observed within the sample, but it does not state that these
pathways must necessary operate in the same way out-of-sample
(i.e., in the present study, in countries outside our study).
FsQCA is an extension of “Qualitative Comparative Analysis”
(QCA) which codes conditions in a binary way in order to show the
different combinations of conditions that can produce a particular
outcome. 126 The “fuzzy-set” in fsQCA means that intermediate
numbers between “0” and “1” are also possible. For the outcome
under investigation here, we chose the proportion of firms in a
country that have selected the two-tier model (i.e., the percentages
as presented in Figure 2, above). The conditions are the ones of
Table 6, above, whereby we use the measure “Few persons
comparison” for the persons needed in the one-tier and two-tier
models. Specifically, we aim to identify conditions that can explain
a high use of the two-tier model; thus, we use the variables “Audit
model available” and “Executives in 1Tier voluntary” with the
inverted values, i.e., as “Audit model not available” and “Executives
in 1Tier not voluntary.

Marx et al., supra note 121, at 119.
Vilmos F. Misangyi, Thomas Greckhamer, Santi Furnari, Peer C. Fiss,
Donal Crilly & Ruth Aguilera, Embracing Causal Complexity: The Emergence of a NeoConfigurational Perspective, 43 J. MGMT. 255 (2017).
126
See Charles Ragin, FUZZY SET/QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS,
www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/ [https://perma.cc/77Z7-M49A].
124
125
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Table 7: Determinants for high and low preference of two-tier model127

The pathways of Table 7 can be compared according to
“coverage” and “consistency,” i.e., the breadth and accuracy of the
solutions.128 In an ideal world, an interpretation of fsQCA results
would also be able to show precisely how each of the pathways
accounts for a plausible configuration of conditions. In the present
case, we can provide some explanations of the configurations;
however, as a caveat, we note that it is not possible to present perfect
narratives that would rationalize all of the conditions and pathways

127
Calculated with the main software for fsQCA: see Charles C. Ragin and
Sean
Davey,
Software,
COMPASSS,
https://compasss.org/software/
[https://perma.cc/AB3L-5P5W].
We have chosen the default consistency
threshold of 0.8 and the recommended threshold for the number of observations of
1, cf. CHARLES RAGIN, USER’S GUIDE TO FUZZY-SET / QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 47 (Department of Sociology, University of Arizona ed. 2008). This table
presents the “parsimonious solution,” as “intermediate” and “complex” solutions
produce no clear results (noting that other studies too are selective in the way they
report the results, for example, García-Castro et al., supra note 122).
128
For more technical definitions see RAGIN, supra note 127, at 85 (“[C]overage
measures how much of the outcome is covered (or explained) by each solution term
and by the solution as a whole . . . . [C]onsistency measures the degree to which
solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome”).
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(nor can we exclude that, for particular cases, idiosyncratic factors
may play a role129).
Specifically, Table 7 shows that entrenchment of the two-tier
model is, on its own, the pathway with the highest consistency and
coverage. Thus, path dependence is a likely explanation for the
continuing choice of the two-tier model. Partly, this may be due to
companies which were established at a time prior to the law reform
which introduced board choice, but there are also likely to be further
factors at play, such as the role of lawyers and other advisors, the
availability of case law, standard articles of association etc.,130 which
make businesses choose the traditional board model.131
In the second pathway, the condition on minority shareholder
ownership is also relevant on its own, though with lower
consistency and coverage. Relatively low shareholder concentration
is likely more prevalent in larger companies, which can indeed be
expected to be more inclined towards the two-tier model as it offers
a more structured way of corporate governance. 132 In addition,
companies with more shareholders may prefer a structure with a
supervisory board as this board can represent the interests of both
majority and minority shareholders in supervision without
involving minority shareholders in management directly.
Three of the legal variables show in the final two high two-tier
pathways, though with fairly low coverage. 133 Thus, while any
relevance here should not be overstated, these two pathways also
have a degree of plausibility. It makes sense that small companies
with often only one or few shareholders want to reduce costs by both
putting only few persons on the board(s) and want to avoid
weakening the power of shareholders. The combination of
remaining shareholder power with strong co-determination is also
plausible, given that larger shareholders may prefer the two-tier

For such factors see also infra Part IV.D.
Such network effects are frequently noted in the discussion about
regulatory competition in corporate law. See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck
Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for Corporate Charters in The Presence of
Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681 (2003).
131
For changes see also infra Part IV.D.
132
Of course, there are also means to structure the one-tier model following
rules on independent directors, board committees etc.; yet, these rules mainly apply
to listed companies, while 98.5% of the companies in our dataset are non-listed. See
supra Part III.B and Part IV.A.
133
Indeed, if we merge the four legal conditions into one, only the first two
pathways remain.
129
130
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model in order to remain powerful vis-a-vis both employees and
directors.
Finally, fsQCA also provides the option to check for the reverse
outcome, i.e., in the present case a low use of the two-tier model. This
is shown in the final column of Table 7, using the same conditions
as in the positive case (while expecting negative signs). It can be
seen that the outcome for the low use of the two-tier model shows
one pathway with only a negative effect for “Executives in 1Tier not
voluntary.” This matches the finding of correspondence analysis
that the variable “Executives in 1Tier voluntary” correlates with a
frequent choice of the one-tier or audit model. A point to note is
that, in contrast to correspondence analysis, the fsQCA results do
not show any effect of the availability of the audit model. This may
be seen as a surprise, given that in Italy and Portugal the two-tier
model is rarely chosen (see Figure 2, above). Yet, the explanation is
that in fsQCA the “Executives in 1Tier voluntary” variable captures
the same information given that Italy and Portugal score highly in
this variable (as do many other countries with a frequent use of the
one-tier/audit model, see Table 6, above).
d. Idiosyncratic Factors
The previous two sub-sections have identified the general role
of path dependency for board structure choice. In addition, this subsection explains that some more idiosyncratic reasons also seem to
matter.
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Table 8: Change in popularity of board structures for companies
established before and after introduction of board choice134

Traditional
One-tier
Countries
Traditional
Audit
Countries
Traditional
Two-tier
Countries

One-tier
0.0%
1.1%
-0.2%

Two-tier
0.0%
-1.1%
0.2%

Board of
Auditors
-

Romania
Italy

20.0%
<0.1%

-20.0%
<0.1%

-0.1%

Portugal
Croatia

-0.2%
4.0%

0.0%
-4.0%

0.2%
-

Czech Republic
Hungary

31.3%
29.5%

-31.3%
-29.5%

-

Netherlands
Slovenia

15.9%
27.6%

-15.9%
-27.6%

-

Denmark
Finland
Luxembourg

Table 8 is based on data that show how far firms established after
the introduction of board choice—for the dates see Figure 1, above—
have more or less frequently adopted the new model than the
previously established companies.135 It can be seen that in five of the
six traditional one-tier/audit countries the percentage change is
very small. For Denmark and Finland, it may also matter that
influential bodies are skeptical about the new model: in Denmark,
the Danish Corporate Governance Committee publicly expressed a
preference for the traditional one-tier model as “constructive and
value-creating” 136 ; and in Finland, a report by the Chamber of
Commerce expressed skepticism toward the two-tier model, for
example, referring to supervisory board members as overpaid and

134
In this table we omit the three countries without recent change, Bulgaria,
France, and Lithuania, but include the Netherlands as it facilitated board choice in
2013 (though it was also available for smaller companies previously). See supra Part
II.C.
135
Detailed time-series analysis will be the topic of a companion paper.
136
Ringe, supra note 19, at 38 (referring to “Committee on Corporate
Governance (2014), Recommendations on Corporate Governance”).
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lacking the expertise and motivation to fulfil their supervisory
role.137
Romania deserves special attention as Table 8 shows the
anomaly that the one-tier model has become even more popular for
companies established post-choice. The explanation is that, when
choice was introduced, more pre-choice companies switched to the
two-tier model than new companies choosing it in subsequent years.
The data from Romania also deviate in other respects, notably
because it is the one-tier model that is more popular with listed
companies than the two-tier one. 138 Further analysis of the
Romanian data reveals that more than one third of its public
companies were established in the early 1990s. These companies
were former state-owned enterprises which were directly
transformed into public companies, initially often with significant
state ownership. The majority of these companies are not listed and
many of them implemented the two-tier model when it was
introduced in Romania in 2006. Romanian corporate law experts
have suggested to us that politicians and state officials were keen on
obtaining positions on these companies’ supervisory boards. Thus,
it is these specific companies drive the peculiar result as regards the
post-choice preferences for the two-tier model in Romania.
The previous sub-sections found that entrenched practices are
the best explanation for why traditional two-tier countries still have
a relatively high number of firms using the two-tier model.
However, Table 8 also shows that there is a decline of the two-tier
model as the new one-tier model has gained considerable attraction
in most of them (averaging the percentages of the five countries
leads to an increase in one-tier of 21.66% and a corresponding
decrease in two-tier use).

137
Leena Linnainmaa, Hallintoneuvosto ei tehosta omistajaohjausta,
UUTISHUONE
(Jan.
1,
2014)
,
KAUPPAKAMARIN
https://web.archive.org/web/20140210152846/http://kauppakamari.fi/uutishu
one/page/2/.
138
See supra Part III.B.
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Figure 6: Board models of newly established companies by year of
establishment following the introduction of the one-tier model in Czech
Republic and Hungary
For the “new” two-tier companies, it is then also revealing to
examine whether their data on the time of establishment reflect a
continuing time-trend in favor of the one-tier model post-choice; in
other words: does the introduction of choice in the five traditional
two-tier countries mean that the use of the two-tier model declines
further in the post-choice years? Figure 6 shows that in the Czech
Republic and Hungary we can indeed observe that post-choice the
one-tier model further advances and the two-tier model further
declines. In the other three traditional two-tier countries (Croatia,
Slovenia, the Netherlands), the time trends of corresponding charts
(not displayed here) are inconsistent; yet, in Croatia and Slovenia
there are only few newly established public companies per year
anyway (sometimes only single-digit figures); and with respect to
the Netherlands, the recent reform was only relevant for large public
companies (while smaller public companies already had choice
prior to the reform).139

139

See supra Part II.C.
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V. CONCLUSION
Today, many European countries allow the choice between a
one-tier model and a two-tier board model, with Italy and Portugal
also providing the choice of a third model with a board of auditors.
Yet, data on the country differences of these choices are rare. In this
article, we aimed to fill this gap, having collected data about the
choice of board models in Europe and using both conventional
descriptive statistics and innovative techniques in order to make
sense of this data at the country level.
Methodologically, this article’s use of correspondence analysis
and qualitative comparative analysis also had the aim of showing
how these techniques developed by other academic disciplines can
be fruitfully applied in comparative legal research. One of their
main advantages is that they do not depend on a large number of
observations as is the case for econometric methods. They are also
intuitive to use for legal scholars as both correspondence analysis
and qualitative comparative analysis are not simply based on
particular numerical scores (such as significant levels) but ask
researchers to use their qualitative skills and knowledge in research
design and evaluation. While this latter aspect introduces a degree
of subjectivity, these methods provide more objectivity than any
unbound interpretation of the underlying data.
In substance, our data show that there are profound country
differences in the prevalence for one of the board models: in general,
the one-tier model is more popular, but there are also some countries
with a preference for the two-tier model, while in Italy and Portugal
the model with a board of auditors has remained the dominant one.
Exploring possible reasons for these different country preferences,
we found that path dependence is the main determinant for country
differences in the preference for a particular board model. Yet, legal
differences also had some impact: here we mainly found that
leaving flexibility in the one-tier model about the appointment of
executives fosters its use, while there is also some evidence that the
use of the two-tier model is more pronounced if a country has low
minimum requirements for number of two-tier board members,
shareholders retain the power to dismiss management board
members in the two-tier model, and it has strong requirements of
employee co-determination.
Finally, despite the path dependence of the use of board models,
our analysis has shown that introducing board choice has often led
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to a gradual decline of the two-tier model. Should this latter finding
be interpreted in a normative way in favor of the one-tier and
against the two-tier model? Without further analysis, this would be
premature as it is well possible that the remaining two-tier
companies benefit from this board structure (e.g., due to a greater
need for structured supervision in larger companies). 140 We do
recommend, however, that countries which only allow a two-tier
structure should introduce an optional one-tier structure as the
foregoing analysis indicates a clear demand for a one-tier structure
across all countries.

140

For the normative discussion, see supra Part II.B.
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